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Abstract
The paper examines how a domestic institutional environment and third-party compli-
ance assessment shape the effects and effectiveness of certification and labeling. Cer-
tification represents a form of transnational non-state market-driven governance of 
the environmental and social performance of firms. Based on an extensive qualitative 
analysis, this paper explores two factors that influence the forest certification program 
of the Forest Stewardship Council. First, the institutional setup and the implementa-
tion and enforcement of domestic law can restrict the effectiveness of certification if 
certification requirements contradict or significantly exceed national law or the insti-
tutional environment presents significant challenges to certification. Second, I show 
that third-party auditing, auditors, and certifiers play a crucial role in this challenging 
institutional environment. I adopt a dynamic approach to the analysis of these elements, 
focusing on how domestic law and institutions and transnational standards interact 
over time. Contrary to existing literature, which emphasizes certification and auditing 
methods and procedures, it is not only how the assessment system is set up but the ways 
it is applied in practice that shape the implementation of voluntary certification stan-
dards and induce certified forestry operations to modify their practices.
Zusammenfassung
Wirkung und Effektivität von Zertifizierung und Kennzeichnung sind mit dem natio-
nalen institutionellen Umfeld und der externen Bewertung von Compliance verknüpft. 
Zertifizierung ist eine Form transnationaler, nicht marktgesteuerter Governance der 
Nachhaltigkeit und Sozialverträglichkeit von Wirtschaftsunternehmen. Auf der Basis 
einer umfangreichen Qualitätsanalyse untersucht diese Studie zwei Faktoren, die das 
Waldzertifizierungsprogramm des Forest Stewardship Council beeinflussen. Zum einen 
können die institutionellen Voraussetzungen sowie Implementierung und Anwendung 
nationaler Gesetzgebung die Effektivität der Zertifizierung einschränken, wenn ihre An-
forderungen den nationalen gesetzlichen Bestimmungen zuwiderlaufen, sie überschrei-
ten oder das institutionelle Umfeld die Zertifizierung erschwert. Zum anderen spielen 
externes Audit, Auditoren und Zertifizierer eine wichtige Rolle in diesem komplexen 
institutionellen Umfeld. Mit einer dynamischen Herangehensweise wird analysiert, wie 
nationale Gesetzgebung, Institutionen und transnationale Standards über längere Zeit-
räume interagieren. Im Gegensatz zur vorliegenden Literatur, die Zertifizierung, Audit-
Methoden und Prozeduren bestätigt, kommt die Autorin zu dem Schluss, dass nicht nur 
der Aufbau des Zertifizierungssystems, sondern die Art und Weise seiner Anwendung in 
der Praxis eine Wirkung auf die Implementierung freiwilliger Zertifizierungsstandards 
und die Einführung zertifizierter Vorgänge in Waldbetrieben haben können.
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The Effectiveness of Transnational Non-state Governance: 
The Role of Domestic Regulations and Compliance 
Assessment in Practice
1 Introduction
Environmental certification and labeling has become a prominent form of non-state 
global governance of the environmental and social behavior of firms (Bartley 2010: 1). 
Non-state certification and labeling refers to programs and initiatives that use a pre-
specified standard to assess the compliance of firms and provide written verification 
of such compliance when found. Since in today’s globalized economy supply chains 
stretch across many borders, many certification and labeling programs are global in 
scope: they use global standards that are created by transnational organizations, includ-
ing NGOs and industry associations, and implemented locally, in many cases in coun-
tries beyond the affluent Global North (Bartley 2010: 1). Over the last three decades, a 
plethora of environmental and social certification programs have emerged in various 
sectors of the global economy, including forests, fishery, mineral mining, agrifood, gar-
ments, toys, and sporting goods. Well-known examples include fair trade initiatives, 
the Forest Stewardship Council and forest certification, and the Marine Stewardship 
Council and fisheries certification.
These programs represent non-state market-driven governance (Cashore et al. 2007: 
8–9). They are founded and run by non-state actors, including multinationals, in-
dustrial and professional associations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). 
Governments are not directly involved in standard-setting and usually do not require 
adherence to these standards. A range of stakeholders are typically involved in standard-
setting: NGOs create market demand for responsibly produced goods in order to pro-
vide firms with market incentives for responsible behavior; firms adopt certification in 
order to derive benefits including better access to markets and niche markets, as well 
as the ability to charge a price premium. Compliance is voluntary but must be verified: 
if professional certification organizations verify that firms comply with a predefined 
standard, producers can label their products with the logo of a standard-setting orga-
nization. Use of a logo communicates responsible use of resources and/or respect for 
human rights and the social and labor rights of workers and communities.1
I am grateful to reviewers Constance L. McDermott and Sigrid Quack for their insightful comments 
on earlier drafts, as well as to Casey Butterfield for her careful language editing. I also thank my in-
terview partners for sharing their time and knowledge with me.
1 This does not mean that governments are completely uninvolved in non-state market-driven 
governance. They usually do not participate in standard-setting, but they may include certi-
fication in their procurement policies, certify state-owned operations, or add certification to 
their legally binding due-diligence provisions for private firms and state agencies (Cashore et 
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The literature on the effectiveness of non-state environmental governance, although 
still relatively scarce, suggests that environmental certification has generated improve-
ments in firms’ environmental and social practices but that its success has also been un-
even, and a larger positive impact has so far been limited (Marx/Cuypers 2010). Schol-
ars have identified numerous factors that influence certification effectiveness. Most of 
them, however, focus either on the institutional design and organizational characteris-
tics of certification initiatives or on the structural features of the domestic production 
and cross-border supply chains and transnational political dynamics. In contrast, I ex-
plore how the national context and certification implementation dynamics at the local 
level influence the effectiveness of certification and labeling programs. I focus on two 
factors that have been neglected in the literature but are likely to have a significant effect 
on how the implementation of certification standards affects practices on the ground: 
domestic regulations and the practice of compliance assessment. 
Numerous studies of certification and labeling have emphasized the importance of ef-
fective governance institutions in the adoption of certification and labeling, because a 
well-developed regulatory framework and sound institutions make the gap between 
public rules and private standards small and compliance easy (Marx/Cuypers 2010: 413; 
Pattberg 2006b). It is largely for this reason that certification has been most widespread 
in advanced industrialized countries. Marx and Cuypers (2010: 422–423) tested this 
hypothesis statistically using a large N data set and found no correlation between cer-
tification uptake and a country’s institutional setup. The present paper, in line with the 
growing literature on transnational non-state governance interactions (Eberlein et al. 
2012), investigates whether the relationship between domestic institutions and regula-
tions and the operation and effectiveness of certification and labeling is more subtle.
I broaden the concept of effectiveness beyond uptake, to include behavioral changes 
triggered by certification, and explore how the interactions between domestic gover-
nance institutions, regulations, and practices affect the translation of transnational 
standards into on-the-ground practices. In particular, I examine the implementation 
of transnational standards within a specific domestic context where transnational stan-
dards significantly exceed national regulations or contradict them and where gover-
nance institutions are less effective and durable than in many advanced industrialized 
countries. It may be predicted that certification is not likely to enjoy broad support in 
such contexts, nor is it likely to generate significant change in management practices. 
My study confirms this effect, but only to a certain extent. It also shows that creative 
and skilled actors, by using the opportunities that domestic institutions offer, can push 
certification and promote better on-the-ground practices. Another important aspect I 
al. 2011). The growing literature on transnational business governance interactions shows that 
interactions between state and private actors are key to the dynamics of governance fields, na-
tional uptake of transnational private programs, and their on-the-ground impact, as this paper 
will also argue (Cashore et al. 2004; Eberlein et al. 2012; Gulbrandsen 2010, 2012; Overdevest/
Zeitlin 2012).
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address is the temporal dynamics of the interactions between transnational standards 
and domestic institutions and regulations. Domestic regulations change and may have 
a different impact on certification over time. I adopt a dynamic approach in my analysis 
and trace how changes in a domestic regulatory framework reinforce old challenges and 
create new ones. 
The central argument of the paper is that national regulations and certification’s com-
pliance assessment practice affect the effectiveness of forest certification. National regu-
lations can affect forest certification in two ways. First, since certification principles 
commonly require compliance with all national laws and regulations, national certifica-
tion requirements have to be adapted to national legislation. A given national certifica-
tion standard might not challenge certain environmentally unsound practices already 
prescribed by law. There could be different reasons for this: in some cases, challenging 
certain prescribed practices would lead to serious contradictions between national reg-
ulations and certification standards and increase certification costs. This in turn could 
decrease the willingness of forestry operations to pursue certification. Second, national 
regulations and enforcement practices may create significant institutional challenges 
for non-state market- and NGO-driven initiatives. For example, certification as a non-
state regulatory instrument primarily affects individual private enterprises. At the same 
time, however, such enterprises are not the only organizations that may be responsible 
for environmental management. In the forest sector, some forest management practices 
may be conducted in privately managed, certified forests by other organizations, in-
cluding national or local forest services, and may turn out to contradict the certification 
standard. NGOs and companies negotiate exemptions from domestic regulations or use 
existing law that is ignored by state authorities in order to justify new practices in forest 
management. In this way they are able to introduce new practices into their manage-
ment systems, including conservation of high-conservation-value forests (HCVFs) and 
biodiversity protection. 
In the second part of the paper, I examine how this legal complexity interacts with the 
ways that certification compliance assessment and auditing is applied in practice. Pre-
vious studies have focused mainly on auditing procedures and an assessment system 
setup (Kalfagianni/Pattberg 2013), whereas I focus on the application of these elements 
in practice. I examine how competition between organizations that offer certification 
services to enterprises and other factors related to auditing will affect certification effec-
tiveness. Certified companies bear direct certification costs (e. g., the costs of assessment, 
accommodation and transportation costs for the assessment team, and fees charged by 
the certification organization). Since there is more than one certification organization 
in the market, they compete with one another to win business from companies seeking 
certification. This may lead to lower certification costs, but at the same time it may also 
decrease the quality of compliance assessment. In order to generate an advantage in the 
market for forest certification services, certification organizations may try to cut costs 
by reducing the staff or hours required for a compliance assessment. This lack of time 
and/or personnel, however, may cause compliance assessment to be less thorough, and 
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noncompliance may be overlooked. Other factors that may also influence the relative 
thoroughness of assessments include the monitoring agencies’ and stakeholders’ lack of 
resources to control certifier performance and motivate better outcomes.
I examine these propositions by evaluating how national regulations and certification 
assessment practices have shaped the effectiveness of forest certification by the For-
est Stewardship Council in Russia. The paper is based on an in-depth qualitative case 
study of the development and practice of forest certification in Russia conducted in 
2006–2008 and 2011. After a brief section on the relative effectiveness of transnational 
non-state governance, I introduce forest certification as a case study. I then describe the 
case selection and methods, followed by an exploration of how national regulations 
and compliance assessment procedures influence forestry practices. In the conclusion, 
I relate my findings to the broader debates on how the domestic institutional environ-
ment and the practice of compliance assessment in certification systems influence the 
effectiveness of certification and labeling.
2 Effectiveness of transnational non-state governance:  
Uptake and behavioral change
The concept of effectiveness has received considerable attention in the literature on 
international environmental regimes. Scholars of effectiveness agree that it is an elusive 
multidimensional concept “whose separate dimensions … frequently do not co-vary 
in any simple way” (Young 1994: 142). Generally speaking, effectiveness describes the 
degree to which an institution or a regime contributes to solving or ameliorating the 
problem that motivated its establishment (Miles et al. 2002: 4). This definition is vague, 
however, and masks the complexities of the operation and the impact of environmen-
tal regimes (Young 1994; Young/Levy 1999). One way to deal with this vagueness is to 
distinguish between “simple” effectiveness and the broader consequences of a regime 
(Young 2004: 5–9). Broader consequences refer to the effects of a regime beyond its 
motivating problem or issue area and include cross-regime interactions, effects on do-
mestic politics, broad societal transformations, and effects on international society and 
politics. Scholars who go beyond motivating problems in their studies of the impact of 
certification and labeling report positive results, including public policy improvements 
and the diffusion of environmental norms and multi-stakeholder deliberative forms of 
governance (Pattberg 2006a; Rametsteiner/Simula 2003).
“Simple” effectiveness, in contrast, refers to the direct effects of a regime on a given issue 
area or motivating problem. When discussing direct effects, it is common to distinguish 
between outputs, outcomes, and impacts representing a chain of consequences (Un-
derdal 2004: 34). In general, output refers to the development of regulations and policy 
instruments to address a specific problem (Young 2004: 12). Similarly, in studies of the 
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effectiveness of non-state certification and labeling, output is measured with a set of 
indicators ranging from the stringency of norms and rules and the strictness of auditing 
procedures to the adoption rates and general public support of programs and initiatives 
(Fuchs/Kalfagianni 2012). Outcome, in contrast, refers to behavioral changes that can 
be attributed to the implementation of and compliance with the regime’s outputs, e. g., 
regulations and policy instruments (Young 2004: 12). Behavioral changes may refer to 
specific improvements in practices, environmental planning, and management systems 
and performance. The last element in the chain of consequences is regime impact, de-
fined as the extent to which the behavioral changes triggered by a regime contribute to 
solving or ameliorating the motivating problem (Young 2004: 12–13).
Since the impact of a regime often cannot be clearly identified and attributed to the 
regime operation because of the complexity of the issue and the considerable method-
ological difficulties,2 my definition of effectiveness focuses on the output and outcome 
aspects. I define effectiveness in this paper as the degree to which certification recognizes 
and rewards good on-the-ground practices and helps to identify and modify unsound 
practices in ways that are likely to improve the environmental, social, and economic 
impact of the management and use of natural resources. This means that I focus mainly 
on behavioral outcomes, i.e., changes in specific operational, social, and environmental 
practices at the level of an individual enterprise. The advantage of this definition is that 
it does not exclude problem-solving or focus exclusively on compliance, but addresses 
more broadly the behavioral changes in certified operations that are likely to produce 
positive change in forest management.3 
Most research on the effectiveness of private governance has focused on the output of 
private certification and labeling. Fuchs and Kalfagianni (2012) reviewed the emerging 
literature and identified numerous factors shaping the output of non-state governance 
initiatives. These include institutional and organizational characteristics of programs 
(participation structures, information strategies, private actors’ preferences and capaci-
2 It is difficult to distinguish between the effect of the regime operation and other factors – e. g., 
the global market dynamics or the financial crisis (Fuchs/Kalfagianni 2012: 300). Moreover, 
whether or not behavioral changes contribute to achieving prespecified goals or alleviate a 
problem in a complex natural system may become visible decades after a regime has been es-
tablished. Finally, the definitions of problems and goals are socially constructed, change over 
time, and “there is generally a substantial scope for judgment in specifying the boundaries or 
individual regimes” (Young 2004: 5). Therefore, judgments of regime impact may vary. For 
example, Marx and Cuypers (2010) have argued that the impact of forest certification has been 
limited, since it been unable to reduce the rates of deforestation and biodiversity loss that they 
defined as motivating problems. At the same time, the judgment may be different if the mo-
tivating problem is defined as unsustainable forest management. From this perspective, forest 
certification has promoted responsible forestry practices (Newsom et al. 2006; Rametsteiner/
Simula 2003) and can be described as an effective instrument.
3 Regimes can also produce negative effects that worsen environmental or social conditions 
(Young/Levy 1999; Belton et al. 2011). In this paper, I focus instead on positive effects that oc-
cur or do not occur as a result of certification.
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ties, ability of programs to reduce transaction costs and provide benefits, and involve-
ment of various stakeholders, in particular NGOs), structural characteristics of sectors 
and global value chains, problem characteristics (e. g., nature of the problem and the 
characteristics of the solutions, in particular the existence of win-win situations). The 
explanations based on these factors – both endogenous and exogenous to certification 
programs – are relevant and important, but they ignore the implementation dynamics 
and the interactions between actors in a multilevel certification system in a specific na-
tional context. In contrast, the emerging literature on international regime complexity 
suggests that it is important to take the implementation dynamics into account in order 
to explain specific policy results (Alter/Meunier 2009; Dobusch/Quack 2013). Several 
studies on non-state certification and labeling do take domestic factors into account, 
including the organizational capacities of supporting coalitions (Espach 2009) and the 
structure of domestic production and domestic policy (Cashore et al. 2004; Cashore et 
al. 2007), but they explain certification and labeling output (such as uptake and sup-
port) rather than behavioral changes (such as improvements in production and man-
agement practices). 
In comparison to the research on output, research on outcomes is relatively scarce. Fuchs 
and Kalfagianni (2012) and Kalfagianni and Pattberg (2013) have argued that outcomes 
depend on the quality of output (stringency of standards and compliance assessment 
methods, uptake and support, etc.), the institutional and organizational characteristics 
of programs (e. g., information and transparency strategies), and the structure of the 
problem. The more malign the problem is, the less effective the non-state governance is 
likely to be (Kalfagianni/Pattberg 2013). While these are important factors, institutional 
design features alone may not be sufficient to explain the outcomes of private certifica-
tion and labeling regimes. Procedures and standards are important not only in and of 
themselves, but in how they are applied in practice. I therefore examine how two factors 
that have been largely neglected in the literature on environmental certification have 
shaped the implementation and impact of forest certification as a private regulatory 
tool: domestic regulations and compliance assessment. The first factor deals with the 
institutional and legal context in which certification standards are implemented. The 
second describes the ways that the system of assessing compliance with certification 
standards is organized and applied in practice.
3 The Forest Stewardship Council and its certification program
The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) was the first organization to launch an inter-
national program of forest certification and certifier accreditation. As an international 
nongovernmental organization seeking to promote responsible forest management of 
all types of forests in all regions of the world, the FSC defines responsible forest man-
agement as environmentally appropriate, socially beneficial, and economically viable. 
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The organization has developed a set of global Principles and Criteria (P&C) for good 
forest management and a third-party system to verify compliance with these, in which 
independent certification organizations accredited by the FSC assess the compliance of 
forest operations with the FSC’s P&C. If compliance is verified, the independent certifi-
cation organizations issue FSC certificates to the operation. Certified forest operations 
can label their products as coming from well-managed forests. Since the establishment 
of the FSC in 1993, over 147 million hectares of forests in 80 countries have been certi-
fied as well-managed, and over 21 thousand chain-of-custody certificates that enable 
the tracing of the timber in a supply chain have been issued (FSC 2011). Between 2005 
and 2008, the size of the FSC market grew from an estimated $5 billion to $20 billion 
(FSC 2008a: 13).
Shortly after the establishment of the FSC, a range of certification programs emerged 
worldwide as a reaction and alternative to the FSC’s forest certification program. Most 
of these programs were business-led initiatives, and most of them, including the Sus-
tainable Forestry Initiative founded by the American Forest and Paper Association, the 
certification program of the Canadian Standards Association, and the national certi-
fication schemes in most European countries and several developing countries (Bra-
zil, Chile, and Malaysia), joined an international umbrella organization for national 
certification programs called the Program for the Endorsement of Forest Certification 
(PEFC). The PEFC was able to become a global competitor to the FSC (Auld et al. 2008: 
191–192). Approximately 237 million hectares of forests are currently certified under 
the PEFC (PEFC 2012). Together, the FSC and the PEFC have certified approximately 
9.5 percent of the world’s forests (calculations based on FAO 2011: 118). For many envi-
ronmental groups, however, “the FSC remains the only credible scheme” (Ozinga 2005: 
38). Scholars have also shown that FSC standards are more prescriptive than PEFC stan-
dards (Auld et al. 2008: 192). 
The question is, then, what the broad adoption of forest certification standards means 
in practice, at least in certified forests. To what extent does forest certification require 
real change, and how is the extent of the change required determined? And finally, what 
does the prescriptiveness of standards mean in practice? In this paper, I focus on the 
impact of the FSC on forestry practices in Russia and examine how national regulations 
and certification practices shape the outcomes of the implementation of FSC standards. 
In the next section, I will justify my case selection and describe the sources of data.
4 Sources of data and case selection
Russia is a promising case for studying the implementation and impact of FSC forest 
certification standards, not only because of its environmental and economic impor-
tance, but also because of the gap between concurrent high certification rates, con-
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tradictions between FSC standards and domestic forest regulations, and widespread 
unsound forest management practices that negatively affect the condition of forests 
(Dudley et al. 1995).
In 2003–2012, approximately one-fourth of Russia’s total privately managed forest land, 
or 30.6 million hectares, was certified by the FSC as well-managed (calculations based 
on data from the Federal Forest Service Agency (Federalnoe Agentstvo Lesnogo Kho-
zyaistva 2009) and the Russian Office of the FSC (FSC Rossiya 2013)). The high level 
of acceptance of forest certification in the Russian forest sector per se is not surprising, 
mainly because a significant portion of producers depend on exporting common tim-
ber products to European markets (Malets 2013: 306). Pressed by broad environmental 
campaigns, international buyers have begun requiring certification from their Russian 
suppliers (Tysiachniouk 2006). Moreover, although illegal logging, unsuccessful for-
est governance reforms, and corruption represent serious problems for Russian forests 
(Lehmbruch 2012; McDermott et al. 2010: 197, 200–204, 213), they are less prominent 
in the certified segment of the Russian forest sector and do not represent a significant 
challenge to Russian companies’ compliance with FSC standards (Tysiachniouk 2006; 
Malets 2011: 36). Enforcement of basic forest regulations, such as regulations related 
to land ownership and tenure, is not problematic either. As a result, it may appear that 
certification has not been particularly difficult for Russian timber producers to attain. 
The major challenge for complying with FSC standards and improving forest manage-
ment, however, is implementing requirements that either contradict or exceed already 
extensive and prescriptive national forest law. These requirements include mitigating 
the impact of forest use on the environmental condition of forests, protecting HCVFs 
(e. g., primary undisturbed forests), and conserving biodiversity in managed forests. 
They are essential to ensuring the ecological functions and integrity of forests and the 
protection of endangered species, ecosystems, and landscapes. Investigating how such 
requirements are implemented when they contradict national law helps us to under-
stand whether and to what extent forest certification is likely to improve the compliance 
of forest operations with internationally recognized forest management standards and 
facilitate the emergence of more environmentally sound forest management practices. 
The role of auditing and compliance assessment is critical here and allows us to study 
the impact of certification auditors on company practices: since the Russian certifica-
tion market has several auditors, we can analyze how competition between them affects 
the thoroughness of compliance assessment. 
FSC forest certification, particularly in Russia, represents a promising case for evalu-
ating the effectiveness of non-state environmental governance. Forest certification is 
one of the oldest and most advanced global certification programs. Several certification 
programs, including the Marine Stewardship Council, have been modeled on it (Auld/
Gulbrandsen 2010). Understanding the system of forest certification may offer further 
insight into whether certification and labeling can successfully promote environmental 
and social change. Furthermore, Russia represents a group of understudied cases, since 
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most research on forest certification focuses on advanced industrial countries, includ-
ing the United States, Canada, and Sweden. Less is known about so-called developing 
and emerging market economies, which are characterized by weak enforcement of do-
mestic regulations, poor environmental conditions, and weak engagement by civil so-
ciety. Yet Russia has been quite successful in adopting forest certification requirements, 
as the data above suggest. Now the question is how requirements are actually being 
translated into practice. 
I use a qualitative case-study approach that is largely based on extended semi-structured 
interviews with global and local actors that have been actively involved in the FSC’s for-
est certification program in Russia and at the global level. I conducted 47 interviews in 
2006–2008, with FSC officials in the FSC International Center in Bonn, representatives 
of NGOs, certified company managers, forest scientists, officials from various certifica-
tion bodies, auditors, certification consultants, and members of the Russian national 
initiative. Additional three interviews with FSC staff members and members of the Rus-
sian national initiative were conducted in December 2011. Interviews were combined 
with my observations of various official meetings and FSC seminars in Russia and at 
the FSC’s International Center in Germany. In addition, I analyzed position papers and 
internal documents from the FSC and other organizations. 
5 The effect of domestic regulations
In this section, I examine the institutional challenges that national laws and regulations 
– primarily old and new forest laws – pose for forest certification in Russia, and whether 
certified companies are able to deal with them. First, I identify fundamental institu-
tional challenges that certified operations, auditors, and certification proponents face. I 
focus on the structural problems that the national regulatory environment, constituted 
by national laws and regulations (law on the books) and their implementation (law in 
practice),4 creates for forest certification. Second, I explore whether the FSC standard 
challenges the unsound forest management practices prescribed by law or those actu-
ally occurring on the ground. The FSC forest certification system requires specifying 
and adapting their relatively broad global P&C of good forest management into a set of 
regional or national indicators that can then be used as a basis for standards implemen-
tation by enterprises and compliance assessment by certification organizations. In the 
FSC system, these indicators are designed either by certification organizations or by FSC 
national initiatives. I therefore examine whether the Russian national standard that in-
cludes the indicators challenges “bad” forest practices. Third, I assess the extent to which 
certified operations are actually able to implement FSC requirements in a challenging 
regulatory environment when the requirements contradict national law or exceed it.
4 See Halliday and Carruthers (2007:296) on law on the books and law in practice.
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Domestic institutions and regulations, as well as their implementation in practice, are 
a fundamental influence on the effectiveness of FSC certification and labeling. Russia 
has developed a highly complex, detailed, and prescriptive set of forestry and environ-
mental regulations (McDermott et al., 2010: 201; interview with national initiative ex-
ecutive). The country is also a signatory to the International Biodiversity Convention 
and several other international environmental treaties. Yet the overall institutional envi-
ronment and forest governance practice have not encouraged the efforts by companies 
and environmental activists to promote responsible forest management through forest 
certification.
Traditionally, Russian forest governance was strongly centralized. In Soviet times, the 
Federal Forest Service – Rosleskhzoh – was a dominant actor in forest policy and prac-
tice. Industrial logging was separated from silviculture (Lehmbruch 2012). Silvicultural 
activities were carried out by the Forest Service through its local branches – leskhozy 
– whereas industrial logging was performed by for-profit forest enterprises – lesprom-
khozy. Industrial logging and silviculture remained separate even after the free-market 
reforms of the early 1990s. Forest enterprises were privatized, but forest land continued 
to be federal property. The Federal Forest Service retained most of its powers and con-
tinued to be responsible for forest monitoring and inventory, development of forestry 
regulations, forest management planning, reforestation, forest land leasing, regulation 
enforcement and control, logging permits, oversight and inspection, designation of 
protected areas, forest protection, and a significant set of silvicultural practices, includ-
ing sanitary harvests and forest thinning.
Forest enterprises would lease forest land or purchase standing trees on a specific site 
for logging, but they were not actual forest managers. As users of forest resources, they 
had to coordinate their management plans and forest operations with the forest author-
ities. The forest authorities allocated logging sites, issued logging permits, designated 
protected areas, defined reforestation quotas, determined harvest volume and annual 
allowable cut, and conducted sanitary harvests and forest thinning in the forests leased 
by private enterprises. They also followed numerous, often ambiguous and contradicto-
ry regulations that many environmental organizations, forest scientists, and companies 
found outdated, economically inefficient, and environmentally inappropriate. But the 
enterprises had to comply with the authorities or risk incurring penalties and having 
the extension of their lease contracts denied, even though it was difficult “for even the 
most legally conscientious forest operator to conduct operations without any violations 
of the law” because of a lack of clarity in the regulatory framework (McDermott et al. 
2010: 203).
Particularly worrying is that forest authorities conducted silvicultural operations, in-
cluding sanitary harvesting (also called salvage logging) and intermediate thinning (also 
called maintenance logging), in forests leased by certificate holders who had no control 
over these operations. Many environmentalists, company managers, and national and 
international forestry experts consider sanitary harvests and intermediate logging to 
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be one of the most widespread illegal and environmentally unsound practices in Rus-
sia (Lehmbruch 2012; Newell and Lebedev 2000). Intermediate thinning refers to the 
removal of certain trees from regenerating forests in order to increase the future value 
of these forests and to shape their structure. Sanitary harvest (or salvage logging) is the 
removal of old, damaged, or ill trees that constitute a threat to the forest (e. g., increased 
fire risk) as a result of a natural disturbance, disease, or insect invasion (Newell/Leb-
edev 2000: 20). The forest authorities, however, removed not old and ill trees in their 
intermediate logging operations, but commercial grade trees that could be later sold at 
a higher price for the production of more valuable sawn wood. Some observers estimate 
that in Khabarovskiy Kray in the Russian Far East, the fourth largest federal region in 
Russia and an illegal logging hot spot, “82 % of the logs harvested under ‘salvage log-
ging’ licenses were commercial grade timber” (Newell/Lebedev 2000: 20).
The free market reforms of the early 1990s left local forest service departments sys-
tematically underfunded. Sanitary and intermediate maintenance harvesting helped to 
increase forest service revenues, but also bred corruption and facilitated shady relation-
ships between the forest authorities and the private firms contracted to perform sani-
tary and maintenance harvesting. A new wave of forest governance reforms was begun 
in 2006, motivated in part by the growing corruption among forest authorities, but so 
far seems to have been unable to reduce the pressure of sanitary harvesting on forests: 
in early 2012, environmental groups were alarmed to find that the area of Korean pine 
forests in the Republic of Khakasia (South Siberia) allocated for sanitary harvesting in 
2012 was 13 times greater than the area allocated for sanitary harvesting in 2011. The 
Russian government prohibited industrial logging in Korean pine forests in November 
2010 (Lesnoy Klub 2012).
Certified enterprises have also been affected by the semi-legal sanitary and maintenance 
harvesting being performed by local forest service departments. Certified companies 
and environmental NGOs in the Republic of Karelia (northwest Russia) expressed con-
cern about the extent of sanitary harvesting in their forests. They felt that they did not 
have full control over the forests they had leased and were losing timber from these for-
ests. A certified large pulp and paper mill leasing more than 2 million hectares of forest 
confronted federal, regional, and local forest service units with their unsound practices 
and organized a field experiment to demonstrate that the mill was able to perform 
the types of logging in question more efficiently and environmentally appropriately 
than the local forest service or external contractors. The results of the experiment were 
confirmed by the NGO representatives I interviewed, including Greenpeace, which was 
also present at the experiment (interview with industry executive; interview with forest 
worker; interview with NGO representative). Yet sanitary logging by local forest services 
persisted.
Despite Russia’s detailed and prescriptive environmental regulations and international 
commitments (McDermott et al., 2010: 201; interview with national initiative execu-
tive), many regulations are not integrated well into forest legislation, for example the 
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protection of biotopes and endangered species. This is especially true of so-called pro-
duction forests (as opposed to protective and reserve forests), the type of forest in which 
forest enterprises most frequently operate (interview with national initiative executive). 
As a result, a “full utilization”5 approach predominates: clear-cutting remains the most 
widespread logging technique. Forest officials tend to require the removal of all trees 
from a logging site, regardless of their environmental value and ecological functions, 
and to impose heavy fines for noncompliance (interview with NGO activist; interview 
with national initiative executive). This creates pressure on certified companies to fol-
low domestic regulations at the expense of certification, the latter of which requires 
them to minimize the impact of forest management, particularly logging, and to protect 
key biotopes, ecologically important structural elements at the logging site, and envi-
ronmentally valuable forests.
The enactment of the new forest code in December 2006 was the start of substantial 
reforms in Russian forest governance that many environmental activists, forest policy 
experts, and scholars have deemed a failure (Lehmbruch 2012; Yaroshenko 2011; Yaro-
shenko et al. 2009; Hitchcock 2010). The 2006 forest code created a new structure of 
forest governance and redistributed powers throughout the federal, regional, and lo-
cal levels. The Federal Forest Service (Rosleskhoz) retained regulative functions (forest 
inventory, development of forest regulations, research and education, and budget dis-
tribution), whereas leasing, forest law enforcement, forest protection, and forest man-
agement planning were transferred to the level of a federation unit (e. g., Oblast, Repub-
lic, or Kray). Local forest service branches were restricted to administrative and forest 
management functions. Their staffs were significantly reduced (Yaroshenko 2011). At 
the federal level, a new State Forest Inventory was established in order to provide the 
forest service agencies of federal units with reliable information on forests. The agen-
cies were then expected to develop a regional forest management plan based on this 
inventory. District forest service agencies, now called lesnichestvo, were to develop local 
forestry regulations – a forestry reglament. Based on the reglament, enterprises would 
then develop a ten-year forest use plan. Forest management and silviculture were trans-
ferred to enterprises, which were no longer obliged to obtain logging permits (these 
were replaced by logging declarations) and consequently became responsible for forest 
planning and for management and silvicultural measures, including intermediate and 
sanitary logging, in their leased forests. Lease licenses for 10–49-year periods were now 
to be sold at open auctions (see McDermott et al. 2010: 202–203).
Environmental activists, forestry experts, and forest managers were initially optimistic 
that the introduction of a new forest code would help enterprises better comply with 
the FSC requirements. They expected that forest enterprises would become the actual 
forest managers, rather than mere leasers, and hoped that enterprises would be able 
to select logging techniques and reforestation measures, develop their forest manage-
ment strategies and plans, and conduct logging in ways that would be more appropri-
5 I borrow this term from McDermott/Cashore/Kanowski (2010: 213)
Malets: The Effectiveness of Transnational Non-state Governance 13
ate to their short- and long-term environmental and economic goals (interview with 
NGO activist). However, it soon became clear that the federal and regional authorities 
would not be able to complete regional forest management plans and the subsequent 
district reglaments based on them within the two-year period prescribed by the new 
forest code (Hitchcock 2010: 31). Pressed by the delay and the upcoming deadline, the 
forest authorities and forest enterprises developed their respective forest management 
plans simultaneously. This caused a significant number of discrepancies and contradic-
tions between and within them. By the time all three types of forest management plans 
were expected to have been enacted or approved, the old forest management plans had 
ceased to be effective, but the new ones were largely either incomplete or not harmo-
nized (Yaroshenko et al. 2009: 16–17). 
Moreover, contrary to early expectations that lease license holders would be granted 
more flexibility in managing their forests, forest management planning by forest enter-
prises remained relatively rigidly regulated and inflexible. Enterprises were no longer 
obliged to obtain logging permits, according to the new forest regulations, but they still 
had to submit a forest declaration for the upcoming year listing all silvicultural activities 
and wait for it to be approved by the district forest service. No changes could be made in 
the forest declaration after approval. In addition, silvicultural activities could no longer 
be transferred to the next year, including logging, even though unexpected weather con-
ditions, forest fires, and insect infestations could make the implementation of a forest 
declaration problematic and might require changing the initially planned measures or 
relocating logging sites on a short-term basis. These problems were not explicitly ad-
dressed in the new regulations, and short-term changes were directly prohibited. More 
importantly, the designation of high conservation value areas and their protection for 
forest certification often occurs spontaneously and requires immediate or short-term 
action, which the new regulations do not allow, since any short-term changes in plans 
or logging declarations are prohibited (Yaroshenko et al. 2009: 50–51).
Environmental considerations were not included in the new forest code either. The 
primary objectives of the forest code do refer to sustainable forest management, non-
depleting use, and the conservation of the environmental functions of forests as funda-
mental principles, but “there is little follow-up in subsequent parts of the code” (Hitch-
cock 2010: 21). Excluding biotopes and endangered species from logging, therefore, 
continues to contradict national regulations and persists as a problem for certified com-
panies. Finally, while the new forest code creates a State Forest Inventory, the inventory 
will not become fully active until 2020. 
Five years on from the start of reforms, the new system essentially does not work. More-
over, during the intervening years, the old inventory system that had been severely un-
derfunded after the economic and political turmoil of the 1990s was completely abol-
ished. The current forest management plans at the federal, regional, and local levels 
are based on incomplete and outdated information about the condition and the de-
velopment of forests. This information dates back fifteen to thirty years, when the last 
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comprehensive inventory was conducted (Yaroshenko 2011). In these circumstances, it 
is unlikely that forest enterprises will be able to develop accurate and precise long-term 
forest management plans that will guide their logging and other forestry operations in 
the coming years. This in turn will likely make assessing the economic viability, envi-
ronmental appropriateness, and other aspects of these plans highly problematic, since 
certification auditors must also rely on the outdated information of the old forest in-
ventory system. 
The FSC’s Russian office, the national initiative, and several NGOs supporting FSC, 
including World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), have endeavored to include several 
requirements in the forest code and supporting laws and regulations that would make 
these compatible with forest certification. But the preliminary negotiations over the 
forest code were extremely controversial. Parliamentary and public debates focused pri-
marily on forest ownership issues. The draft prepared by the Ministry of Economic 
Development and Trade allowed the privatization of forest land, and as a result faced se-
vere resistance from an unusual ad hoc coalition comprised of several members of Par-
liament, various members of government, environmentalists, and the president himself. 
The privatization clause was therefore removed from the draft forest code (Hitchcock 
2010: 26).
At the same time, members of Parliament and government officials did not give any se-
rious consideration to other important issues, including environmental considerations, 
public participation, and mechanisms to reward voluntary forest certification (Hitch-
cock 2010). Neither environmental NGOs nor forestry and ecology experts were con-
sulted during the drafting process (Hitchcock 2010: 24). NGOs reported an inability to 
lobby Parliament or the ministry because of their lack of access to traditionally closed, 
top-down administrative and legislative systems (interview with NGO activist). Neither 
do the new forest code and supporting regulations include any mechanisms to ensure 
public participation and consultation in their implementation, so the system remains 
closed and does not allow for effective participation in forest management planning 
and forest law enforcement. Despite this, in the period from 2008 to 2011, the FSC’s 
Russian office, the national initiative, and various NGOs established a joint commission 
with representatives from the Ministry of Natural Resources to discuss the possibili-
ties of including FSC-compatible environmental and social requirements into the new 
forest legislation. Several meetings took place. However, these attempts have not yet 
led to a harmonization of FSC requirements and national legislation (interviews with 
national initiative executive and FSC Russia executive).
In summary, the recent reforms in forest law and policy have created an extremely chal-
lenging environment for forest certification in Russia. They have made it difficult to 
translate certification requirements that contradict national law into on-the-ground 
practices, and they have slowed down the development of enterprises’ forest manage-
ment plans. The lack of inventory data complicates long-term planning and manage-
ment. Sanitary logging and other practices have not been stopped in certified forests. 
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Biodiversity conservation measures are not reflected in the new forest code; rather than 
forest protection and conservation, the code emphasizes forest resource utilization and 
investment. The current developments in Russian law and enforcement practices pres-
ent important challenges that forest certification, as a private regulatory instrument, can 
hardly address. They will likely impede the implementation of certification standards.
How persistent are these challenges? Will they disappear once the difficult transition to 
the new forest code has taken place? This remains to be seen, but so far the introduction 
of the new code has been very slow, incomplete, and underfinanced. Many forestry ex-
perts, environmental groups, and policy experts evaluate the prospects for the new for-
est code rather pessimistically (Lehmbruch 2012; Yaroshenko 2011). Hitchcock (2010) 
has suggested that the forest code is extremely weak legislation: badly designed, incon-
sistent, and poorly framed. She argues that adequate implementation of the new forest 
code requires the introduction of numerous amendments and the development and en-
actment of a significant number of supporting laws and regulations, which would likely 
take at least another several years. Illegal logging continues in the meantime, and has 
even increased since the new forest code was introduced (Hitchcock 2010: 38). Accord-
ing to Lehmbruch (2012), the weakening of the forest service system was a contributing 
factor in the severe forest fires in central Russia in summer 2010. 
Some of the Russian challenges have been difficult to address, including the lack of 
independent and reliable forest inventory data, ambiguities and inconsistencies in the 
new forest code, and the lack of accurate regional forest plans and poor forest manage-
ment practices by state authorities, but forest certification has been able to deal effec-
tively with a number of other problems. These problems are associated not with the law 
on the books, but with the interpretation of existing regulations by certified companies’ 
forest management and forest officials at the local and regional level. These parties have 
been able to activate and selectively use pieces of the existing forest regulations to allow 
them to implement contradictory FSC requirements and state provisions at the same 
time. In the remaining paragraphs of this section, I first show that the FSC standard 
indeed exceeds national law. I then evaluate how certified companies have successfully 
dealt with the requirements that exceed or contradict national forest regulations. 
The FSC national standard for Russia consists of a list of national indicators specifying 
global principles and criteria, along with several annexes that include basic compliance 
guidelines. The Russian standard was accredited by the FSC in 2008 after almost a de-
cade of numerous lengthy rounds of negotiations and revisions. Before it was approved, 
six certification organizations working in Russia each used their own interim standards. 
The differences in interim standards caused concern among NGOs and even the cer-
tification organizations themselves (personal communication with NGO activist). In 
contrast, most NGO activists approved of the introduction of the national standard, 
according to a national initiative executive (interview with national initiative execu-
tive). The accreditation manager for ASI (Accreditation Services International), an ac-
creditation body for sustainability standards systems founded by the FSC to provide 
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independent accreditation of national initiatives, national standards and certification 
organizations in its own and other certification programs (e. g., the Marine Stewardship 
Council and Aquaculture Stewardship Council), considered the FSC national standard 
to be well-designed and strong (interview with ASI accreditation manager).
Although the majority of national requirements are not believed to present a serious 
challenge for implementation in Russia, several key criteria and indicators do exceed 
or contradict national law and practice and have required significant implementation 
efforts (interview with NGO executive, see also Malets 2011: 34–36). One of the im-
portant issues here is the “full utilization” approach encouraged in national regulations 
and traditional forestry practice. Forest certification standards, on the other hand, sup-
port minimizing the impact of forest management, particularly logging, on forests and 
require the protection of key biotopes, ecologically important structural elements on 
logging sites, and environmentally valuable forests, all of which contradict the “full uti-
lization” paradigm. The FSC standard promotes at least two alternatives to the “full 
utilization” approach: one is the transition from large-size clear-cuts (removal of all 
trees on a relatively large logging site) to narrow strip cuts, multi-stage cuts, and selec-
tive cuts (“softer” logging techniques that are believed to reduce the negative impact 
of logging on forests). The other alternative is the exclusion of key biotopes, rare and 
endangered species and ecosystems, and valuable forests (e. g., old-growth forests) from 
clear-cutting.
As far as the first alternative is concerned, the national standard requires the forest com-
panies to develop a program to gradually transition from clear-cutting to “softer” log-
ging techniques (see Indicators 6.3.7 and 6.3.8 in FSC 2008b: 44). However, the Russian 
standard does not specify what such programs should include and how they should 
be evaluated, but merely that the program should exist and that the percentage of for-
est being harvested with “softer” techniques (compared to clear-cuts) should be docu-
mented. The evaluation of such programs is left to certifiers: certification organizations 
are entitled to judge whether companies have made enough progress toward “softer” 
harvesting.
The second alternative requires excluding ecologically valuable parts of logging sites 
(e. g., key biotopes) from logging. Russian forest regulations allow certain trees or parts 
of a logging site to be excluded from logging, but these must be documented in a log-
ging permit or declaration before logging begins otherwise the majority of forest ser-
vice officials will consider the conservation of ecologically important sites a violation 
of domestic regulations and penalize logging enterprises accordingly (interview with 
national initiative executive). Neither does the national standard specify how to comply 
with both national regulations and FSC requirements. Forest enterprises take different 
measures in order to fulfill FSC requirements and avoid penalties from the local forest 
service. In Arkhangelskaya Oblast, for example, a large industrial logging group negoti-
ated general exemptions from logging rules with the regional forest service (interview 
with industry executive). The local forest service officially permitted the company’s log-
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ging units to exclude certain trees or key biotopes from logging without penalties. In 
the Republic of Karelia, a large paper mill hired a group of young foresters and trained 
them to identify key biotopes and other types of trees that required special protection 
according to FSC standards (interview with company manager). This group joins for-
est service officials when they inspect logging sites before issuing logging permits. The 
foresters negotiate individual exemptions to be documented in each logging permit and 
help forest officials to identify trees that should be left on a particular site (interview 
with forest worker). They assist inspectors in formulating exemptions in a way that does 
not contradict legal requirements.
Certification also requires certified companies to conduct an inventory on their own 
(interview with national initiative executive). They must protect ecologically valuable 
forests, including ecologically important old-growth forests, as well as endangered eco-
systems and habitat areas for endangered species. Several companies have declared a 
moratorium on logging in the old-growth forests that they otherwise would most likely 
have cut down, since the forests in question are not protected by law. Certified compa-
nies commission field studies to identify, map, and protect valuable forests, ecosystems 
and endangered species habitats (Malets 2011). 
As shown above, forest certification promotes a number of forest practices that are 
likely to improve the condition of certified forests and protect some of their ecological 
importance (protection of biodiversity and HCVFs). While there is no universal solu-
tion that can be added to the national standard to resolve the contradictions between 
national regulations and FSC requirements concerning biodiversity, individual compa-
nies have been successful in finding compromises on their own. At the same time, the 
features of the Russian forest law outlined in the first part of this section are likely to 
limit the effective translation of FSC forestry requirements into on-the-ground prac-
tices: the state remains unable to provide reliable information on forest resources, bu-
reaucratic obstacles to short-term identification of protected areas persist, legislation is 
incomplete, and ambiguities in regulations and forest management plans continue to 
exist at various levels. 
With such severe legal uncertainty, the role of assessment procedures and certification 
auditors becomes crucial to understanding the impact of certification: how do certifica-
tion auditors assess compliance with FSC requirements in these difficult circumstances? 
I deal with this question in the next section.
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6 The effect of compliance assessment in practice
In contrast to a number of international NGO and media reports (Counsell/Terje Lo-
raas 2002; Böttcher 2012), my interviews suggest that the FSC forest certification pro-
gram enjoys the support of many Russian stakeholders, most notably environmental 
groups. These supporters are convinced that despite numerous difficulties, the program 
has successfully identified and rewarded enterprises whose forest management is in ac-
cordance with most FSC requirements (interview with FSC Russia executive; national 
initiative executive). Certification also gives activists, forest managers, local communi-
ties, and stakeholders leverage to influence enterprises’ forest management and plan-
ning, even as they draw attention to the problems and weaknesses of the FSC assess-
ment system, namely the legal uncertainty that may restrict behavioral change from 
forest certification. Many auditors employ a flexible approach to evaluating compliance 
and many forest managers remain at the lowest margin of change necessary to qualify 
for a certificate (interview with NGO executive). Problems with the compliance assess-
ment practice have been identified by auditors, certification bodies, and stakeholders. 
These findings will have implications for the evaluation of FSC effectiveness in Russia. 
Even though forest certification auditors must regard the FSC standard as a set of strict 
prescriptions enterprises have to follow, they also perceive certification as “a process of 
moving in the right direction” (interview with certification auditor): a beginning of for-
est management reforms at the enterprise level, rather than a final destination. Auditors 
assess companies’ performance not only against the certification standard, but also in 
view of the unfavorable circumstances in which they operate, as well as their progress, 
efforts, and attitudes:
… we see that people actually work [to achieve certification]. We do not expect them to do ev-
erything perfectly. But we see that they are trying to act as international standards prescribe. … 
When we see these positive developments, we realize that the system works. (Interview with 
certification auditor)
This suggests that the efforts and intentions of forest managers are taken into account 
alongside their compliance. This does not mean that auditors can certify any company 
regardless of its performance, but it shows that compliance does not have to be “perfect” 
in the eyes of auditors.
Auditors rely on reason and common sense when making decisions about compliance. 
They are aware that forest enterprises cannot be held responsible for everything that 
they do in the forests they lease, since domestic regulations are often overly rigid and do 
not necessarily stimulate environmentally appropriate forest management. Forest man-
agers may want to protect some parts of their forests as high conservation value areas or 
leave certain trees on a logging site, including ecologically valuable seed trees and dead 
trees, but they know that the local forest service will sanction such behavior:
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And forest companies are not the ones to solve it [this problem]. We can’t require the impos-
sible from them. So we use our common sense to make a decision. (Interview with national 
initiative executive)
Auditors thus become responsible for controlling the implementation over time:
He [an auditor] sees that a company should have a certain document, for example a forest 
management plan. But it cannot develop it before certain governmental regulations are in place. 
… The auditor has to issue a corrective action request, but if a company does everything right 
without this plan, the auditor cannot suspend the certificate. If there are no governmental regu-
lations, the auditor has to control for it. (Interview with FSC Russia executive)
An auditor must use his or her own judgment to make a decision in such a situation. 
There are no documents or guidelines to aid decision-making because there is no forest 
management plan and no federal or local regulations in place.
The system gives auditors some discretion in interpreting standards and making certi-
fication decisions; they will not withhold issuance of a certificate until companies can 
radically reform their forest management over a short period of time. This is partly 
because “forest certification is for advanced companies“ (interview with national initia-
tive executive), but certification organizations will also grant certificates provided that 
enterprises have demonstrated reasonable progress toward better forest management as 
compared to their situation before certification, keeping in mind the difficult context 
in which forest enterprises operate. Not only is actual compliance rewarded, but “good 
intentions” are as well (interview with national initiative executive). The goal is to mo-
tivate enterprises to improve their practices: 
Companies that wanted a certificate and got it in advance … have to confirm that they have 
improved within the few years that follow. If they cannot, they will lose their certificates. … And 
I expect that some companies will lose their certificates. (Interview with national initiative 
executive)
Indeed, in 2007–2012 several certificates were suspended by certification organizations 
because of significant noncompliance with FSC standards. In March 2012, 10 out of 214 
certificates issued in Russia were marked as suspended in the FSC Certificate Database 
(http://info.fsc.org/, accessed on 6 March 2012).
From my observations, it seems plausible that a certification system based on stringent, 
yet relatively broad principles and criteria and giving discretion to certification organi-
zations and auditors is likely to be perceived as credible and effective if (1) major stake-
holder groups are convinced that certification organizations and auditors are able (and 
willing) to assess forest management properly and detect noncompliance and (2) if the 
FSC, as a standard-setting organization, is able to monitor and control certification or-
ganizations effectively. The FSC enjoys relatively broad support among environmental 
and social activists and nongovernmental organizations (Ozinga 2005: 38), but there has 
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also been criticism suggesting that FSC certification system is riddled with corruption 
and abuse and crippled by a lack of monitoring capacity (Counsell/Terje Loraas 2002). 
Although I was unable to detect corruption or fraud, my data indicates that the com-
petition between certification organizations over certification price and the continuous 
rapid expansion of certified forest areas does undermine the ability of stakeholders to 
monitor certification organizations and has a negative impact on the quality of compli-
ance assessment. Here quality is defined as the thoroughness of compliance assessment; 
a lack of quality increases the likelihood of noncompliance being overlooked. 
Many experts have observed that since forest certification began in Russia, around 2003, 
the certification organizations, auditors, and stakeholders involved have experienced a 
significant learning curve, developed auditing skills, and accumulated new knowledge 
and experience (personal communication with an NGO executive, see also Malets 2011). 
Price competition among certification organizations has also intensified, however, and 
this has affected the quality of compliance assessment (interviews with certification 
organization executive; NGO executive; FSC Russia executive; national initiative execu-
tive). Certification organizations calculate the cost of certification based on the area to 
be certified, auditors’ fees, the number of auditors in an assessment team, and the num-
ber of days that the assessment is expected to take. To minimize costs and attract more 
clients, certifiers will decrease number of auditors and experts in an assessment team 
and the number of days designated for each assessment. According to an early supporter 
of the FSC in Russia who participated in several early audits, in 2003–2004 there were 
up to ten auditors and experts attending each assessment. This number has gradually 
decreased to two to four auditors, while the amount of work that auditors have to do 
has steadily increased (interview with NGO activist). As a result, the thoroughness of 
audits is likely to decrease. Auditors risk overlooking noncompliance, and companies 
may then choose to avoid the changes in practice that otherwise would be required for 
certification. An auditor reports: 
The problem is that we now have many certification bodies in Russia. … On the one hand, com-
petition is good. But on the other hand, it is bad, since the price goes down. The price depends 
on the amount of people [in an assessment team]. This is why the quality is going down. … We 
are trying [to maintain the quality], but we have lost several tenders lately because of it. … Here 
is a company in Siberia, 1.5 million hectares. Our offer was to assess it with three people in five 
days, and I think that’s not enough. We calculated the budget using our profit margin, which is 
close to zero, but we lost. This means that someone offered an even lower price. The quality is 
decreasing, that’s for sure. (Interview with certification organization executive)
Five certifiers currently operate on the Russian market for certification services.6 It 
would be reasonable to believe that the growing demand for certification should either 
attract more certifiers to the Russian market or drive the price of certification services 
6 Three certification bodies dominate the market: NEPCon (partner of the Rainforest Alliance’s 
SmartWood) issued 38 out of 75 certificates, or 51 percent; the GFA issued 11 certificates, or 
15 percent; OOO Lesnaya Sertifikatsiya issued 21 certificates, or 28 percent. Soil Association and 
SGS issued two and three certificates respectively (Malets 2012). 
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up. Yet even as more enterprises have become interested in forest certification,7 the pool 
of available certification auditors and certification bodies has not seen any significant 
growth. The most likely reason seems to be the substantial cost of entry into the cer-
tification market: certification bodies are required to complete a time-consuming and 
costly accreditation process; auditors are recruited from among experienced high-pro-
file forest management experts, but before they can act as auditors, they must complete 
at least one year of training and several internships. At the same time, it appears that 
certifiers are not using their advantage in the market: it seems likely that the structural 
and power asymmetries between relatively small certifiers and large companies are im-
peding price increases.
As a result, the number of clients per auditor has increased. Many clients have consider-
able areas to assess and monitor. Certified forest areas range from 8 thousand to 1.6 mil-
lion hectares, with about 150 thousand hectares per enterprise on average (FSC Rossiya 
2013). In addition, the FSC standards, policies, and procedures are growing in number, 
are continuously being revised, and are becoming more complex and formalized. This 
makes it harder for auditors to keep track of new developments and effectively imple-
ment them in practice (interviews with NGO staff member; certification body executive; 
FSC Russia executive). An NGO activist perceived the situation in the following way:
The auditor comes to the forest management unit, and he already has ten of those [forests to 
audit]. And he has to monitor each of them: he has to follow corrective action requests, deal 
with the correspondence, follow the implementation of the requirements, and so on. … And he 
has another ten applications. So he starts to hurry it up. He has ten thousand hectares to assess 
in two days. He quickly collects materials, does not have time for personal interviews, and then 
he leaves. And then there is the certificate. This is decreasing quality. (Interview with NGO 
staff member)
The FSC, ASI, and various environmental experts have also drawn attention to the lack 
of well-trained and experienced auditors and experts in ecology, social issues, worker 
rights, and biodiversity conservation in the rapidly growing certification market in Rus-
sia (interviews with NGO staff member; FSC Russia executive). At a meeting with repre-
sentatives from certification organizations in Russia in April 2007, a representative from 
ASI addressed the systematic inadequate assessment of firms’ compliance with FSC prin-
ciples relating to worker rights and community well-being (Principle 4), environmental 
impact of forest management (Principle 6), forest management plan (Principle 7), mon-
itoring of the social and environmental impact of management activities (Principle 8), 
and HCVFs (Principle 9; ASI 2007). The head of the FSC national office for Russia also 
acknowledged the lack of qualified experts and consultants as a problem and reported 
that only a handful of certified enterprises had actually improved their forest manage-
ment, while the rest had not demonstrated any progress (FSC Rossiya 2007).
7 In 2004–2012, the total area of certified forest grew from approximately 4 to 30 million hectares 
(FSC Rossiya 2013).
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The skeptical attitude that many environmental and social activists involved in forest 
certification have toward auditing has been reinforced by their own diminishing capac-
ity to monitor and control assessments. Environmental NGOs’ resources are limited. 
This makes it difficult for them to participate in the growing number of audits and to 
monitor an increasing number of enterprises between annual audits. NGO staff mem-
bers reported that they used to closely follow the certification process for a handful of 
the first certified enterprises, but could no longer do so because of the lack of necessary 
resources and the greater number of certified areas (interviews with NGO executive; 
NGO staff member). Some activists also perceived that the role and status of external 
assessment observers had changed over time. Initially all observers were welcome at as-
sessments and were able to take part in them without approval, whereas now indepen-
dent observers are required to obtain permission from both the certifying organization 
and the enterprise. In 2009, this rule was codified by the FSC in an FSC Advice Note 
(FSC 2009b). Certification bodies are required to comply with formal advice notes.
We noticed that observers were always present at the first assessments in Russia, while today 
the participation of observers has to be approved by both certifiers and certified companies. If 
it is approved, they like to say: good, now you find your own transportation and accommoda-
tion. We have just been in Visinga [a village in the Komi Republic, 88 km south of its capital] 
but when you go just fifty kilometers further – where are the observers going to stay? There is 
nowhere to stay, and the observers don’t come. … So the formally open system becomes closed. 
(Interview with NGO staff member)
In addition, NGOs complain that the comments reviewers make on auditors’ assessment 
reports are no longer taken seriously. FSC rules hold that assessment reports – the basis 
of a certification organization’s decision to certify an enterprise – are subject to peer 
review by independent experts who did not take part in the assessment, often members 
of environmental NGOs. Certification bodies are required to respond to reviewer com-
ments and to take them into account when finalizing an evaluation report (FSC 2009a). 
The reviewers, however, felt that certification organizations often did not take reviewers’ 
comments into serious consideration (interview with NGO staff member).
In response to the growing concerns environmental and social stakeholders have ex-
pressed about their decreasing control over certifiers’ and producers’ performance, and 
the competition among certification bodies – not only in Russia, but worldwide (e. g., 
FERN et al. 2008; Boström 2012: 11) – ASI and the FSC introduced a set of measures 
aimed at strengthening monitoring and control in the certification program. In 2007–
2008, the ASI began conducting short-notice audits. These complement annual surveil-
lance audits of certification bodies’ performance and are intended to evaluate certifiers 
and producers with little lead time. For example, in 2007 the ASI conducted 14 short-
notice assessments in China, where environmental organizations considered the situa-
tion surrounding forest certification to have become challenging. The ASI also included 
Russia in its so-called high visibility regions, producing additional short-notice audits 
(ASI 2007). Recent short-notice audits took place in June 2011 and March 2012. 
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The FSC and ASI also organized meetings in Bonn, where the two organizations are 
located, and in major forest regions of the world, including a meeting between certi-
fication bodies and major environmental organizations, in order to discuss the most 
challenging global issues in the development of the FSC forest certification program. 
These meetings resulted in a set of agreements and recommendations addressing the 
problem of credibility that the environmental organizations raised. In cooperation with 
national initiatives, ASI has also organized training courses aimed at improving audi-
tors’ qualifications and fostering the development of national indicators for the FSC’s 
generic P&C. The FSC has improved its dispute resolution mechanism and reformed 
its financial and administrative system to increase financial resource inflow and im-
prove its standard-setting and accreditation services (interview with FSC executive). 
Over time, the FSC has also intensified its efforts in developing and providing guidance 
to certifiers, companies, and stakeholders in how to interpret and implement the FSC’s 
standards and criteria. 
In Russia, the FSC national office together with the national working group, environ-
mental organizations, and ASI have organized a series of meetings and training courses 
for auditors and stakeholders. In August 2007, the FSC Russia organized the first two-
day training seminar for certifiers and auditors addressing the most problematic aspects 
of forest certification: HCVFs, new forest legislation, social aspects of forest certifica-
tion, and environmentally appropriate forest planning and management. The aim of 
these seminars was to improve the qualification of auditors and provide guidance to 
certification bodies and their auditors on the interpretation of standards, thereby har-
monizing certifiers’ diverging approaches to certification. Training seminars and meet-
ings still take place regularly.
These measures indicate that the FSC takes the credibility issues and other challenges 
raised by stakeholders seriously. Unfortunately, to date there have been no systematic 
studies of the performance of certification bodies in a cross-national perspective or of 
the effectiveness of the measures introduced by the FSC and ASI to improve the reli-
ability of the certification system. NGO statements and media reports represent the 
only sources of information on the poor performance of certification organizations and 
certified enterprises in various parts of the world and do not permit conclusions as to 
whether the poor performance is systematic and should cause concern among decision-
makers, retailers, and consumers. Scholars also rely on interviews with environmental 
groups and other stakeholders (Boström 2012: 11). My data suggests that the perfor-
mance of certification bodies and auditors should remain under the close scrutiny of 
the FSC, ASI, and stakeholders. At the same time, these data should also be reviewed in 
the context of the emerging debates about the role of trust and distrust between certi-
fiers, FSC executives, and stakeholders. Moreover, relating these findings to the per-
spectives on effectiveness may highlight even more the complexity of implementation 
and of on-the-ground interactions among standards, national regulations, and various 
stakeholders. I address these issues in the conclusion.
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7 Conclusion
My study takes into account the complexities of the interactions among transnational 
sustainability standards and procedures, local actors, and their institutional environ-
ments when analyzing the effectiveness of transnational non-state market-based gov-
ernance. The results presented in two of the sections above, for example, challenge the 
findings of Marx and Cuypers (2010), who tested the relationship between FSC certifi-
cation density (the proportion of FSC-certified forests in a country’s total forest area) 
and governance institutions statistically and found no correlation between certifica-
tion and the institutional setup of a country. They argued that “from an institutional 
point of view, there are fewer obstacles referring to institutional characteristics” (Marx/
Cuypers 2010: 422–423). My results, however, suggest that the relationship between 
domestic institutions and certification is more subtle. Contrary to some expectations, 
an extensive, complex, and prescriptive set of domestic regulations, as in the Russian 
case, may restrict the impact of certification on the ground if these regulations are not 
coordinated and consistent and/or if their implementation and enforcement is weak. In 
Russia, this restriction has been reinforced by ineffective institutional reform.
Yet this argument does not render a complete picture either: my findings do suggest 
that Russian forest law and its implementation pose several serious challenges for the 
implementation of certification requirements, but domestic actors may deal success-
fully with at least some of them. They can activate the existing laws and regulations 
(law on the books) that are not used in action, in order to justify the implementation of 
certification requirements that contradict existing forest management practice. By do-
ing so, they introduce and establish new practices at the level of an individual enterprise 
that may potentially trigger incremental gradual changes in both forest management 
practice and law over time, as the recent historical institutionalist literature suggests 
(Streeck/Thelen 2005; Thelen 2002; Djelic/Quack 2003). More research is needed to 
understand under what conditions this occurs. Particularly important here is the role 
of the creative actors who are able to make strategic use of the resources offered by law 
on the books to pursue their goals and to introduce forest management practices, in-
cluding biodiversity protection on logging sites, that are likely to improve the state of 
certified forests in the long run. 
The second proposition put forward in the beginning of this paper is that the operation 
of the FSC compliance assessment system through independent certification organiza-
tions has a restricted impact on the outcomes of certification standards. First, my data 
suggest that auditors are flexible in interpreting the standard and will evaluate not only 
compliance, but also the performance of certified operations given the difficult context 
in which they operate. Second, the data indicate that key stakeholder groups, includ-
ing environmental activists but also auditors, certification organization executives, and 
executives of FSC Russia, perceive the quality of certification audits as problematic. 
Whereas the national standard for Russia is considered sound, the ways it is implement-
ed in practice do not always match stakeholder expectations. Moreover, auditors and 
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certification bodies report that they operate under the pressure of price competition in 
the market for certification services. The lack of well-trained auditors also contributes 
to concern over the “thoroughness” (quality) of certification audits on the ground.
How unique is the case of Russia? Can be the results of the study be generalized? Forest 
certification is difficult everywhere and entails significant costs. In some contexts it may 
be easier than in others, but generally forest certification standards exceed domestic 
regulations and require changes in existing forest management practices (Newsom et 
al. 2006). What’s more, the inconsistencies in forest law, its orientation toward the use 
and exploitation of forest resources rather than their protection and conservation, and 
the weak enforcement of domestic law are not only typical of Russia, but also exist 
in many other countries other than the advanced industrial economies of the Global 
North. Major forest law reforms have also occurred in other settings: in 2012, Brazil 
adopted a new forest code that some observers fear is likely to interact in unexpected 
ways with transnational state and non-state rules and institutions of forest governance 
(Adelmann et al. 2011). Difficulties with compliance auditing and assessment represent 
a recurrent theme in public debates about certification and labeling (FERN et al. 2008; 
Boström 2012; Böttcher 2012). The challenges described in the paper may therefore 
significantly affect the implementation of transnational standards in other countries 
as well. In general, my study points out the need to take the implementation dynamics 
and interactions between certification and labeling standards and domestic norms and 
transnational and domestic actors into consideration in order to explain the specific 
on-the-ground changes in forest management.
The negative effects that price competition among certifiers and other factors have on 
certification effectiveness deserve our attention, but the interpretation of my data also 
depends significantly on the definition of impact and effectiveness. If effectiveness is 
defined as a forestry firm’s compliance with the pre-specified standard and consequent 
behavioral change (provided there is a gap between the standard and behavior), the in-
ability of auditors and certification bodies to effectively enforce the implementation of 
the standard and control for the quality of their performance may be interpreted as re-
stricting the potential of forest certification to trigger environmental and social change. 
This legalistic approach, however, overlooks an important aspect of effectiveness – its 
uptake. Stringent and rigidly enforced standards may in fact lead to a weakening of the 
effectiveness of certification and labeling. They would likely increase implementation 
costs and discourage companies from improving and certifying their forest manage-
ment. Cashore, Auld, and Renckens (2011: 352) call this a “high standards, low support; 
low standards, high support” dilemma.
More stringent standards could also lead to the emergence of competitor certification 
schemes that would offer lower standards and less strict assessment procedures. This in 
turn would restrict the uptake of more prescriptive standards and undermine their dif-
fusion. Research on forest certification has shown that in regions where FSC stakehold-
ers developed particularly demanding standards, the industry’s initial interest in the 
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FSC declined. Instead, the industry supported certification programs that offered lower 
standards and less strict compliance assessment (Cashore et al. 2011: 352). From this 
perspective, a more flexible evaluation approach might indeed lead to less significant 
behavioral changes immediately, but could foster certification uptake and industry sup-
port for higher standards and trigger incremental change in environmental and social 
practice over time.
In addition, the pressure for more formalized control of certifiers’ performance and 
behavior may be counterproductive, as demonstrated by a study in British Columbia on 
the role that certifiers, and firms’ trust and distrust of them, have in shaping certification 
standards and outcomes (McDermott 2012). McDermott (2012) showed that social ties 
among environmental groups, certifiers, and enterprises facilitated trust and coopera-
tion among them. The more rationalistic system of compliance assessment based on 
formalized control, technocratic competence, and independent certifiers fostered dis-
trust in the FSC system, demotivating producers interested in forest certification and 
increasing concerns about the credibility of the FSC system among environmentalists 
(McDermott 2012: 642). Silva-Castañeda (2012), in her study of the third-party au-
diting of oil palm plantations in Indonesia, came to a similar conclusion: a legalistic 
approach to auditing did not allow auditors to take into consideration the evidence of 
unresolved land conflicts that local communities brought forward, because the stan-
dard and compliance system was based on the rationalistic understanding of evidence 
and did not acknowledge other types of evidence. 
My data show that as certified areas increase and the number of certified operations 
grows, environmental groups are no longer able to participate personally in on-the-
ground audits or to observe them. They also feel that their comments and suggestions 
are no longer taken seriously. This may lead to FSC stakeholder frustration and disap-
pointment in the FSC system. Yet the right solution is not to increase formalized con-
trol, but to enable effective communication and exchange between enterprises, certi-
fiers, and stakeholders during on-the-ground audits.
The conclusions from my study indicate that we must take the interactions between 
various local actors and their institutional environment into consideration in order to 
understand the impact and effectiveness of non-state market-driven governance on the 
ground (Dobusch/Quack 2013; Bartley 2010). Several recent studies of the interactions 
between governance initiatives and various actors point out the importance of such in-
teractions, but these have focused mainly on transnational standard-setting and domes-
tic responses and less on standard implementation (Overdevest/Zeitlin 2012; Gulbrand-
sen 2012). More research is needed if we are to understand local dynamics. The role of 
certifiers, auditors, and auditing in particular has been insufficiently studied, even as the 
emerging literature on environmental certification and labeling suggests that all three 
are critical in shaping governance outcomes (McDermott 2012; Silva-Castañeda 2012). 
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We must pay more attention to the interactions and processes that generate numerous 
credibility issues for certification and labeling, as well as the impact that certification 
and labeling can have on the environmental and social practices of enterprises. Many 
environmental groups and scholars have called for greater emphasis on the performance 
of certifiers (FERN et al. 2008; Boström 2012: 11). More radical organizations have even 
warned that a “race to the bottom” among certifiers is occurring (Counsell/Terje Loraas 
2002). We should critically examine the roots of these perceptions (as my study does) 
and acknowledge that they may be due not only to the problems with certifier and pro-
ducer performance or the political agenda of NGOs, but also to the “spiral of distrust” 
reinforced by increasingly formalized and bureaucratized systems of standard-setting 
and compliance assessment (McDermott 2012). 
Observers have also stressed that not all certifiers are created equal: where some demon-
strate better compliance assessment, others are believed to be weaker (Maletz/Tysiach-
niouk 2009). More systematic research is necessary to understand whether the choice of 
certifiers and certification auditors matters for the quality of forest certification or, in 
other words, whether certification impact depends on who is assessing firms’ compli-
ance with a certification standard. Do profit or nonprofit certifiers perform better? Are 
there other motivators of a certifier’s behavior? Do certifiers only aim for the lowest 
price, or do they also have different strategies concerning the quality of their perfor-
mance? It would be also helpful to compare the performance of certification organi-
zations in countries where the market for certification services is captured by several 
certification organizations (e. g., Russia) with certifiers’ performance in countries where 
there is no competition. Finally, to test the claims of this study, more research is needed 
that compares certification and labeling in different issue areas. 
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